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Commentaries
The following remarks by Monsieur Cadieux were prepared in advance but
were not delivered at the conference.
Marcel Cadieux, c.r.
As I am now engrossed in negotiations involving our maritime boundaries
and our fisheries with the United States, I have not had time to do the detailed
research that I might otherwise have done into the legal aspects of how
Canada and the United States have resolved their bilateral disputes. However,
I have some comments arising out of my experience on the practical side of
these relations as to how our two countries have resolved their disputes
through the years. No inference should be drawn from my remarks, however,
that would anticipate the results of my present work.
It strikes me that both Canada and the United States have preferred over
the years to resolve their disputes through negotiation rather than through
adopting a strictly legal approach to the resolution of their problems. It is for
this reason that agreements between Canada and the United States seldom
contain compulsory provisions for referring disputes to the World Court or
provide for other arbitration proceedings in the event of disputes arising.
Although I am not certain, and I recognize that there are two opinions on
this point, I think things might have been very different if our two countries
had found it possible to accept without reservation the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The actual practice of these two
countries discloses a true reluctance to litigate or arbitrate our differences if a
negotiated settlement is possible.
In addition, the practical nature of the problems that confront Canada
and the United States and the political nature of many of these problems encourage negotiated settlements. References to the World Court or to arbitrators can create problems at a political level since the decision can be
rendered at a time that is politically disadvantageous to one or the other of
the states. There always seems to be an election in prospect. However, from
time to time it has proved useful to make such a reference, and I would cite
as examples of this the Trail Smelter, the I'm Alone and the Gut Dam cases.
Another reason our two countries prefer to negotiate a settlement in the
absence of a joint commitment to arbitration is simply the very great importance of the issues that can arise between us and the Americans. Neither
government in these circumstances wants to risk everything, and concessions
and compromise are distinctly less risky and often a less time-consuming process.
Through the years it has proven safer for both states to compromise on a
solution to their problems. This process is safer, and each side can usually
salvage enough of their position so as to protect their state's basic position.
Arbitration puts everything at risk, and our political ,leaders have generally
not preferred the proposition of risking what you have for what you might
obtain through a successful legal action. Moreover, many of the issues that

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:19

have arisen between us and the Americans have involved questions of policy
rather than the interpretation of treaties or points of international law. This
is another reason that compromises have seemed to be a more appropriate
solution for both of us.
The issues that have arisen between Canada and the United States are so
important for each country that experience has demonstrated an accumulated
preference for a negotiated settlement that is now almost overwhelming.
Times vary, however, and it is possible that in the future greater reference
will have to be made to third party arbitration or the World Court.
On both sides of the border there has been a tradition of friendship and
reasonableness that has assisted in the successful resolution of disputes. The
leaders of both countries are concerned that good sense be applied to our
problems so as to arrive at an equitable solution for the other partner. This
goal is broadly met through negotiation rather than by reference to a third
party. Furthermore, the political leadership in both countries, perhaps particularly in Canada, is judged in part by their ability to govern the relations
between our two countries in a mutually satisfactory manner.
If my impression is right as to our broad preference for the political as
opposed to the juridical approach concerning the settlement of disputes, there
is a related but important additional point to be made. The political avenue
disposes not only of articulated issues and problems through concessions and
mutually acceptable arrangements. The essence of the political approach
involves anticipating problems and managing things in such a way that issues
are avoided. Situations are now allowed to develop in such a way that in the
end there is an issue. The value of the political approach is thus enhanced: it
can claim credit for solving and reducing the number of issues. The image of
the iceberg comes to mind in terms of the issues formally solved through this
process and those which have never emerged and thus have remained invisible. They were part of the iceberg and should be noted when the question of
dispute settlement is considered.
In conclusion, I would like to refer to a personal experience that I had in
1968 when I went with Ministers and other officials of our Government on an
extended tour of Latin America. We visited Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. I had an opportunity to speak with officials of these
governments, and I was impressed by the interest they had in how Canada
had succeeded through the years in developing and maintaining successful
relations with the United States. They wanted to know how we had been so
effective in managing such an important international relationship. They
were also interested in how so large and diverse a country as Canada had succeeded in creating and maintaining a unified position on national objectives
and on the tactics that our country should adopt in resolving these disputes,
and how we had succeeded through negotiations in protecting our basic position and arriving at mutually beneficial results. They cited as examples the
Columbia River Treaty, the St. Lawrence Seaway and the International Joint
Commission, among other successful agreements. While their own relations
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with the United States were important for them, their national experience
had not been the same.
I could only suggest that it was through negotiated settlements that we
were able to achieve fair and equitable results. I do not think we can lick
every problem in this manner; some problems, because of their legal nature
or for some other reason, lend themselves to reference to a third party or the
World Court for resolution. The maritime boundaries and fisheries questions
might be an example of a case where a different approach is necessary. It
seems clear now, however, that we have demonstrated a definite preference
for the resolution of our problems with the United States through diplomacy
rather than through legal procedures. In the eyes of these foreign observers,
this effort has seemed to be worthwhile.
I hope that these brief remarks will throw some light on the course of
Canadian-American relations and the method that we have used most often
through the years to resolve our mutual problems.
The following commentary was delivered by Monsieur Cadieux at the conference.
Monsieur le president, je sais que le temps qui nous est imparti est court.
Je vais donc essayer de faire vite dans lFespoir que je reussirai, en meme
temps, i faire bien.
J'ai et6 tr&s impressionne par l'incident qui a marque le debut de cette
rencontre. J'envisage avec effroi ce qui pourrait se produire un jour, si on me
prsentait sur la base de la biographie d'un Cadieux qui fut dlcd, Yimagine
la tete des gens dans l'auditoire lorsqu'on arriverait 1 la fin de la biographie
et qu'on annoncerait que le confdrencier est d~c~de depuis quelques annhes.
Etant fonctionnaire, naturellement, je me suis prepare A ce d~bat. J'ai
proctd6 de la facon pessimiste qui est caracteristique de ceux de ma generation. C'est 1 dire, j'ai suppose que les documents et les confdrenciers ne
seraient pas disponibles avant l'ouverture des d~bats et que je me trouverais
dans cette situation que les fonctionnaires craignent par dessus tout. Avoir 5
improviser, sans texte et sans avoir obtenu l'autorisation des quatorze autres
minist~res qui doivent toujours dire: Oui, avant que vous puissiez dire quoi
que ce soit. D'ailleurs, je manifeste aussi une autre caract6ristique qu'on leur
attribue d'ailleurs tras g~n~ralement aux fonctionnaires cette naivete de ceux
qui ne sont pas exposes 1 l'influence quotidienne et directe des contribuables;
j'ai suppose que vous auriez lu les notes que, dans mon pessimisme, j'avais
prepare d'avance. Je vais, donc, prockder sur ces deux hypotheses et vous
livrer quelques-unes des id6es, des impressions- que m'ont sugg~r~es les deux
presentations entr~mement interessantes qui ont &6 faites tout a l'heure.
Sur un detail, je me permets une observation au sujet des commentaires
du professeur Baxter concernant la Commission internationale conjointe. Je
suis d'accord avec lui. C'est l'instrument ou l'institution la plus importante
dont nous disposons pour ce qui est du r~glement des questions de fronti~re.
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Mais, je crois que le facteur essentiel pour le rgglement des diffarends entre le
Canada et les Etats-Unis tient A r'attitude des deux peuples A I'endroit l'un de
l'autre, l'attitude du Parlement et du Congr~s i l'tgard des relations entre les
deux pays et surtout l'attitude des deux gouvernements quant aux relations
qu'ils veulent entretenir. Fondamentalement, les deux pays desirent avoir de
bonnes relations et les consequences se manifestent dans la facon dont nous
abordons le r6glement de nos diffdrends ou de nos disputes.
Je suis d'accord en particulier avec le professeur Baxter, que ce que nous
avons fait essentiellement c'est non seulement de regler nos diffbrends, mais
de les regler par la voie politique, ce qui entraine comme consequence que
I'6l6nent essentiel dans nos relations c'est la gerance de nos relations et c'est
la prevention des diffarends et des disputes. Qa, je crois, c'est I'6l6ment
caracteristique.
Les propos du professeur Macdonald m'am~ne A souligner un autre
point. La question du r~glement de nos diff~rends par l'interm~diaire de
juges ou d'arbitres, c'est a dire, la voie judiciaire. Sur cet aspect, je ne veux
pas generaliser parce que je n'ai pas eu le temps avant de venir participer i
vos travaux aujourd'hui, d'entreprendre des recherches prolongtes. Vous comprendrez que dans les circonstances actuelles, cela m'a 6t6 impossible. Mais si
je me r6fare A mes quinze ann6es de pratique i Ottawa, puis A rues cinq
annes et demie i Washington, je crois que les diffarends entre le Canada et
les Etats-Unis sont genaralement importants et qu'ils sont surtout de caractare
6conomique et politique. Les chefs politiques ne sont dds lors pas tr6s disposes
A laisser des diffdrends qui sont importants et politiques degendrer au point
oil ils sont articulds, et au surplus, ofi il faut les soumettre A la decision d'une
tierce partie. I1 existe aussi le problkme, le risque, que les chefs politiques
doivent envisager. Remettre un difftrend important entre les mains d'une
tierce partie, crxe dans le public l'impression que les procedures nationales
et les relations avec les Etats-Unis ont echoue, et vous prenez ainsi le risque de
tout perdre ce qui, dans une matiare d'importance du point de vue politique,
peut-etre extremement dangereux. J'en arrive i la conclusion, tir6c i de la
pratique (qu'on peut, peut-6tre, pas documenter de fagon acad6mique. .) que
le recours i 'arbitrage, dans le cas des diff~rends entre le Canada et les
Etats-Unis n'a que l'apparence d'un raglement judiciaire. En r6alitC, il s'agit
toujours d'une decision politique. Une decision politique de ce genre ne sera
prise que si la cause est relativement peu importante. Si elle dtait importante
par d6finition, il serait presqu'impossible de la confier A un tiers pour en
decider. Autrement dit, comment un leader, sur une question qui a des implications politiques vitales pour lui et pour son pays, pourrait-il abdique sa
responsabilit6 de deux fagons en disant. J'ai dchouc dans rues relations avec
notre important voisin pour trouver la solution et maintenant que les juges
s'arrangent et qu'ils appliquent la loi. Et ceci dans un contexte particulier. I1
faut bien reconnatre que, dans bien des secteurs, le droit international
6volue-je m'en f6licite, personnellement-mais si vous avez A conseiller un
gouvernement quant A la politique qu'il doit suivre, vous devez reconnaltre
qu'il devient de plus en plus aleatoire, difficile, dangereux, de predire quel va
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8tre le r6sultat de l'intervention d'un juge. Jusqu'a un certain point, le r~lgement judiciaire peut jouer un r6le, mais je ne suis pas tout i fait d'accord
avec les conclusions du professeur Macdonald. Mais je le rejoins, d'une certaine facon, A cause des n6gociations dans lesquelles je suis engage. A cet
6gard, comme disent mes compartriotes de langue anglaise, j'ai des nouvelles
pour vous. Le rapport irt.rimaire va paraltre demain. Ce rapport, pour la
premiere fois, fait dtat de l'accord entre le gouvernement du Canada et celui
des Etats-Unis au sujet du raglement arbitral des differends qui pourraient
survenir entre nos deux pays dans tout le domaine qui nous est imparti. Pour
ce qui est des ptcheries, en particulier, vous pourrez lire les details demain,
nous prdvoyons l'etablissemznt d'une Commission avec deux sous-commissions
de six membres chacun pour les deux pays. Au dessus de ces deux souscommissions il y aura deux co-presidents choisis conjointement par les deux
gouvernements. Voili une chose interessante dejl. I1 y a moyen de repudier
ces co-presidents au bout d'un certain temps si vous n'6tes pas satisfaits, I
condition de les remplacer avec l'accord de l'autre partie. Ces deux copresidents ont pour tiche naturellement de presider les commissions. S'il n'y a
pas accord, ils se saisissent du differend, cherchent A persuader les deux
gouvernements, is sont lies. Voili une autre chose int~ressante. Si lex deux
co-presidents ne s'entenden,, pas, la decision est confi6e 5 un arbitre, choisi
d'avance. Un autre point est lui aussi extremement intaressant, je crois
qu'il est nouveau. Nous prevoyons distribuer les stocks, et les espaces de
poisson sur nos deux c6tes entre trois categories. I1 y a une categorie qui interesse les poissons, les ressources marines, qui sont dans la region frontali re,
il s'agit d'un domaine oii les int6rets economiques des 6tats membres sont
substantiels. Or vous avez, je crois pour la premiere fois, un accord entre
gouvernements pour confier A deux co-presidents et, eventuellement, a un arbitre, des decisions dans un domaine qui affecte leurs int6r6ts permanents et
substantiels. L'idee des co-negociateurs, en sugg6rant des co-president qui
assistent aux reunions des commissions, c'est que tous les differends, qu'il
s'agisse d'interpretation, d'allocation de stocks, et ceux qu'on peut d6crire
essentiellement comme des differends politico-conomiques soient soumis au
raglement arbitral. I1 s'agit d'avoir des hommes qui soient au courant, qui
aient suivi les deliberations, et qui puissent intervenir avant la prochaine
campagne de peche. La preference des hommes politiques et la logique de
notre systame democratique veulent que ce soient les chefs politiques qui
prennent les decisions vitales dans l'int6ret du pays. L'importance d'avoir des
bonnes relations entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis qui conditionne 6ventuellement l'attitude des chefs politiques, conduit, 1 un systame oci, normalement,
on cherche A regler les differends avant qu'ils soient articules et on les rtgle
par la voie politique. Je m'empresse d'ajouter que dans le cas des pecheries,
sur nos deux c6tes et dans le cas du development des ressources d'hydrocarbones, il est possible qu'il ait desormais une exception assez substantielle. Il
ne faut pas que vos consideriez que l'accord sur cette procedure judiciaire
pour les diffarends qui pourraient survenir entre nous soit acquis definitivement. II peut tr~s bien rester lettre morte, si nous ne nos entendons pas,
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dans un deuxiiime temps sur l'allocation des stocks, sur les pourcentages de
ptche . attribuer 1 chacun des pays et, surtout, sur la question des frontiares
maritimes que nous allons aborder ces jours prochains. Je suis professionnellement et personnellement Porte A l'optimisme. J'espare que nous allons rdussir
darn le temps qui nous a ete attribue. Si nous r~ussissons, lors des prochains
congres nous pourrons parler d'un nouveau d~veloppement pour ce qui est du
raglement arbitral ou judiciaire de diffbrends entre le Canada-et les EtatsUnis dans un domaine qui, jusqu'A maintenant, je crois, a &6 reserv6 aux
m6canismes politiques.
Je sais que vous 6tes A court de temps. Je pense que j'ai soulene quelques
points qui me semblent essentiels. J'aurai peut-etre l'occasion, au cours des
debats subsequents, d'intervenir de nouveau.
Monroe Leigh
I would like to disavow, at the very beginning, the notion that my comments will be launched from an American perspective. I recognize that the
program makers, for legitimate reasons, had billed Professor Baxter as speaking from an American perspective, and Dean Macdonald as speaking from a
Canadian perspective. I mention this because it illustrates one of the conclusions I have come to in preparing for this section: in nearly all cases there is
no peculiar Canadian point of view on a matter of principle. Of course, if
you are in a dispute about territory, you are worried about where the line is.
But the principles which have to be applied are not matters of dispute.
This was vividly impressed upon my mind when I was a young lawyer in
Washington in 1948. I was given the assignment of reviewing all of the
dockets of the International Joint Commission from 1909 until that date. Our
firm had been retained in the canal waters dispute between India and
Pakistan, and so I spent a number of weeks in the archives of the United
States. It was a very lonely business going through every docket up until that
time; I think there must have been fifty or sixty. And I was struck by the fact
that in nearly all cases, there was no important nationalistic principle involved,
either on the American side or on the Canadian side. This has led me to
believe that what is really needed in the whole array of dispute settlement
mechanisms is a guarantee of impartiality by the adjudicators who have the
ultimate decision-making responsibility. If the issue cannot be settled by
discussion, then what is needed is simply a guarantee of impartiality on the
part of the ultimate adjudicator. While the International Joint Commission
has done wonderful work in the field of developing the facts in a particular
dispute-and so often the dispute has been settled just from the mere exercise
of bringing out all the facts-nevertheless, it seems that in most of these matters, thinks would go more rapidly if it were known that there could be a
compulsory adjudication at some point in the future if negotiations fail.
That is one of the principal observations I wish to make about this problem. I do not know that I would agree entirely with Professor Baxter. His
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paper is very lucid and comprehensive. But I think his sense of tidiness,
which is very great, leads him to suggest sweeping away all of the existing
machinery. I doubt whether that is really worth the trouble it would take in
securing agreement. I would leave most of the machinery in place since much
of it can be used from time to time. But I would like to see some form of
compulsory dispute settlement adopted between the countries in advance.
While it may have to have some limitations, I think it would contribute
greatly toward the momentum of negotiations for a diplomatic settlement
which is to be preferred in all cases.
One of the difficulties in not having a fixed timetable, or some sort of
pressure towards negotiation, is the fact that in our two countries constituencies develop around any particular point of view. We have had this
throughout our national experience together. And once the constituency
develops, the arguments soon tend to be phrased in terms of slogans rather
than in terms of truly acceptable legal principles. We in the United States
have had our share of slogans, of course. "Fifty-four forty or fight" is one of
the most notorious. I had an amusing example of this a year or so ago when I
was involved in discussions with Canadian officials regarding the Gulf of
Maine dispute. Someone sent to me (whether Canadian or American I do not
know, because it came anonymously) a clipping from a Canadian newspaper
which described the twentieth anniversary gathering of a high school class in
your province of New Brunswick. As a part of their celebration, the group
went out and planted a Canadian flag on one of the disputed islands. This
shows the tendency of popular opinion to coalesce around a particular point
of view.
Let me turn to another point which seems to be very important. The
volume of issues developing between the United States and Canada is now
growing -by leaps and bounds. It is extremely difficult for the diplomatic
machinery of the two countries to keep up with it. For example, when
Maurice Copithorne and I were working on the Gulf of Maine dispute, I
found it difficult to schedule times when we could meet to discuss this problem. From this I conclude that Professor Baxter is correct in that we might
profit from extending the Commission's use in our bilateral relations.
The International Joint Commission has, of course, been an enormous
success in dealing with boundary water problems. We might have commissions in other areas. The United States has set up a great array of commissions with the Soviet Union, various Soviet-bloc countries, and also with
various Middle Eastern countries. The existence of such commissions serves
the purpose of giving an institutionalized priority of attention to problems
that ought to be dealt with before they develop hardened constituencies. Such
constituencies may make it more difficult, politically, to resolve the dispute. I
would venture to say that in the field of antitrust law, a commission which
met periodically between Canadian and American antitrust enforcers would
be a salutary step. I say this because my own limited experience within the
United States government in antitrust matters serves to confirm how difficult
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it is to handle this kind of problem through diplomatic channels. For example, one of my dubious successes as Legal Advisor was in persuading the
Department of Justice not to name Canadians as co-conspirators in the
celebrated potash case. It was considered a victory that I got the Justice
Department to agree that the Canadians would be named as "unindicted" coconspirators. Well, that was certainly a very modest success.
Let me try and describe to you the bureaucratic situation within the
United States government. You go over to the Justice Department to see, let
us say, the new head of the antitrust division. He has probably never heard of
prior notification arrangements between the State Department and the Justice
Department, so you must first convince him that this is a sound policy. Even
if he knows about it, he may say that we have a new Attorney General who
feels very strongly about these matters so he will have to go and talk to him.
There is nothing that happens automatically to secure the kind of notification
that is needed. In the celebrated Bechtel case, that was very important from
the "-American point of view. The State Department received virtually no
notification of this case which had enormous consequences for our relations in
the Middle East. Instead, it was treated at such a high level that the word
came by telephone on a Wednesday afternoon before Thanksgiving, and the
letter asking for our comments was sent over that afternoon. It was not seen
by anyone on our staff until early Monday morning. By Monday afternoon,
high officials in the Justice Department were already telling the press that the
State Department was delaying their program of bringing suit against
Bechtel. This is the reality of what goes on in bureaucracy. Consequently, I
feel very strongly that we could profit greatly by increasing the number of
joint commissions that are set up for special subjects such as antitrust litigation.
Let me return to the suggestions that have been offered. As I listened to
Professor Baxter and Dean Macdonald, it seemed to me that there is general
agreement that further steps in the direction of compulsory adjudication are
necessary. I feel very strongly that the threat of compulsory adjudication is
the strongest possible incentive for a rapid movement toward a negotiated settlement. I am especially grateful to Dean Macdonald for pointing out with
such particularity and so much clarity the new possibilities that exist in securing the adjudicatory mechanism of a panel of the International Court of
Justice, with the assurance that the panel will-be of a composition which is
satisfactory to both the United States and Canada.

